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Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Toward a
Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine
For local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we
are but one people, one nation, one power. Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no
less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Current state and local divestment legislation, aimed at South
Africa's system of apartheid, 2 has renewed the debate over constitutional limitations on state actions affecting foreign affairs. 3 The legislative enactments vary in scope. Some call for complete
disassociation of the governmental entity from companies doing business in South Africa, while others condition sanctions upon a company's non-adherence to basic civil rights principles. 4 However, it is
generally acknowledged that such legislation has a common purpose:
to register a moral protest against the system of apartheid, and to
pressure the South African government to abolish it. 5 While it is gen-

erally acknowledged that these "ends" are noble, the question remains
as to whether the "ends" or the "means" employed are
1. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 442-43 (1968) (Stewart, J. concurring) (citations
omitted).
2. Apartheid ("separateness" in Afrikaans) stands for the policy of strict racial segregation and discrimination practiced by the minority government in South Africa. For an overview of the debate on South Africa, see South Africa: Is There a Peaceful Path to Pluralism?A
Symposium, 57 Bus. & Soc'y REV. 4 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the
FederalPower in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, (1986); Comment, The Constitutionality
of State and Local Governments' Response to Apartheid: Divestment Legislation, 13 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 763 (1985); Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and
Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469 (1987); State and Municipal Governments
React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of the Constitutionalityof the Divestment Campaign, 54 CIN. L. REV. 543 (1985).
4. See, e.g., The Sullivan Principles, reprinted in, Exec. Order 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg.
36861, § 2(c) (1985).
5. See Note, supra note 3, at 822-24, which cites introductory language of various statutes which describes the purpose of the legislation.
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constitutional. 6
The constitutional debate centers around the perceived exclusivity of federal power in the area of foreign affairs. As Madison observed in the Federalist Papers, "[i]f we are to be one nation in any
respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations."'7 Madison's
advice takes on additional meaning in today's interdependent world
where the acts of a single state, or states in the aggregate, arguably
have an increasing effect on foreign nations. 8 The federal government
must come to terms with this growing problem if it is to "speak with
one voice" 9 in foreign affairs. At the same time, the government must
insure that, in fashioning a remedy, it does not unduly restrict the
freedom of individuals or the sovereignty of the states.
This Comment will explore the various remedies available. The
first section begins with a structural overview of the United States
Constitution and examines how this particular problem fits within
that structure. The second section examines current approaches to
the problem and their potential shortcomings. The third section proposes a model for analyzing state and federal conflicts in the area of
foreign affairs. This model is based on the structural theories discussed in section one, with an eye toward avoiding the shortcomings
discussed in section two. The final section examines the application of
the proposed model to the divestment legislation enacted by California in 1986.
II.

STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW

Generally speaking, the Framers of the Constitution created the
federal government to perform those functions which the states alone
6. The question of whether or not divestment is an effective means is beyond the scope
of this article. For an analysis of the impact of divestment legislation, see Note, supra note 3,
at 824-27. For a debate on the merits of divestment, see Discerningthe Divestment Debate by
Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi (leader of South Africa's 7 million Zulus and chairman of the South
African Black Alliance, speaking against divestment), 57 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 79 (1986), and A
Pleafor InternationalSanctions by Desmond Tutu (Bishop of Johannesburg and Nobel Peace
Prize winner, speaking for divestment), 57 Bus. & Soc'y REV. 66 (1986).
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (J. Madison) (Mentor ed. 1961).
8. For example, California, if viewed as an independent nation, would rank among the
world's top ten economic powers. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC SOCIETY, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 68-69 (5th ed. 1981). Consequently, California, whether

alone or in addition to other states, has the potential to significantly influence the activities of
foreign nations.
9. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
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were incompetent to perform.' 0 While defining those functions was
the source of much debate, there was general agreement that one such
function was the conduct of foreign affairs.1 I Unfortunately, this sentiment did not find its way into the specific language of the
Constitution.
However, there are a number of enumerated powers which suggest that such a sentiment did exist. For example, Congress is authorized to regulate foreign commerce and the value of foreign coin, to
declare war, and to lay and collect duties.' 2 In addition, the Executive is authorized to make treaties, appoint ambassadors, and to receive ambassadors and other public ministers.13 Finally, the Judiciary

is given exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases.' 4
On the other hand, the states are prohibited from engaging in many of
the same functions.' 5 These specific examples, in conjunction with
the basic structure of the Constitution, suggest that the area of foreign
relations is controlled exclusively by the federal government. Indeed,
the courts have reached this conclusion in a number of cases, the most
prominent of which is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.16
In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland contended that the states

never had "international powers" and thus there was no need to enumerate them in the Constitution as being "given" to the federal government; such powers were "necessary concomitants of
nationality."' 17 The following year, in United States v. Belmont,' 8 Jus-

tice Sutherland again addressed the federal government's exclusive
power over foreign relations, holding that "[i]n respect of ...

our

foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes
10.

M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 77

(1962).
11. Id. at 47. "The least that could be done was to establish a stong central government
which should have control of all foreign relations. These things were self-evident and there
seems to have been a general unanimity of sentiment in favor of the reforms proposed." Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
15. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
16. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The Court upheld a Joint Resolution of Congress which delegated power to the President to ban arms sales to countries involved in the Chaco conflict in
South America. Curtiss-Wright had made such sales.
17. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
18. 301 U.S. 324 (1937) The Court upheld the assignment of funds, by the Soviet Union
to the United States, which had been deposited in a New York bank by a Russian corporation
prior to the Russian Revolution. Id. at 332. The bank had refused to recognize the expropriation of the funds by the Soviet Union. Id. at 326.
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the state of New York does not exist."' 19
While Justice Sutherland's analysis has received some criticism, 20
his conclusion that states have no direct interest in foreign relations is
generally accepted and has been followed in subsequent Supreme
Court rulings. For example, in a case similar to Belmont, United
States v. Pink,21 Justice Douglas noted that the states have no concurrent powers in the area of foreign affairs. "No State can rewrite our
foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over
external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
'22
government exclusively.
Thus, the issue of whether the federal government has exclusive
power over foreign affairs appears well settled. 23 As one commentator
observed: "even at the height of state power, no role was sought or
suggested for the States in regard to United States international affairs. The States have never existed where relations with other nations were involved. There have been few 'States righters' in foreign
affairs."' 24 It follows, then, that states are constitutionally prohibited
from engaging in such affairs, and further, that states should likewise
be prohibited from enacting legislation which unduly interferes with
the federal exercise of foreign affairs powers.
III.

CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES

Recent analysis of the problems raised by state divestment legislation has focused on three constitutional approaches. 25 First, and
19. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
20. See Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation:An HistoricalReassessment,
83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973).
21. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). The Court upheld the assignment of
assets by the Soviet Union to the United States, involving a Soviet insurance company based in
New York which had been nationalized following the Russian Revolution. Id. at 234. Under
New York law, the assets would have gone to the state for distribution. Id. at 210.
22. Id. at 233.
23. See generally, HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972); THE
FEDERALIST No. 3 (J. Jay); No. 4 (J. Jay) No. 5 (J. Jay) No. 22 (A. Hamilton); No. 42 (J.
Madison); No. 80 (A. Hamilton).
24. Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign
Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 936 (1959). Some commentators have suggested that the
major proponents and opponents of "states' rights" have switched sides on the divestment
question for transient political purposes. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 3. However, at least for
those "states righters" who base their beliefs on notions of federalism, there is nothing inconsistent with asserting state sovereignty in certain domestic affairs and federal sovereignty in the
area of foreign affairs; both positions speak to the structural integrity of the government as
established by the Constitution.
25. See supra note 1.
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perhaps most popular, is the dormant commerce clause doctrine, 26
applied in this case to foreign commerce. Arguably, under this theory, the economic ramifications of divestment legislation may conflict
with the dormant power of the federal government to regulate foreign
commerce. Second is the doctrine of preemption, under which courts
may invalidate state laws which conflict with actions taken by the
federal government. 27 Under this doctrine, some state divestment legislation may conflict with the policy of "constructive engagement" established by President Reagan. 28 Third is the relatively undeveloped
doctrine of dormant foreign affairs powers. Under this doctrine,
states are precluded from usurping or unduly interfering with the fed29
eral government's power to conduct foreign affairs.
A.

Dormant Commerce Clause

Under the dormant commerce clause doctrine, the judicial
branch can overturn state laws which interfere with interstate commerce in areas the federal government has left unregulated. 30 After
finding that the state law affects interstate commerce, the court does
not automatically strike it down. Instead, if certain criteria are met,
the court applies a balancing test known as the Pike test to determine
whether or not the resulting burden on interstate commerce renders
the law unconstitutional:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities. 31
One potential version of a dormant foreign commerce test could
26.

See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), where the court first

acknowledged its own power to void state laws affecting interstate commerce, even in areas
where the federal government had been silent.
27. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 324-27 (1986).

28. Executive Order No. 12,532, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1985).
29. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968), where the Court holds that state
regulations "must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy."
30. See supra note 23.
31. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted). The test is
known as the "Pike balancing test."
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be formulated by simply substituting "foreign" for "interstate" in the
Pike test cited above. However, the major cases involving foreign
commerce issues suggest that a dormant foreign commerce clause
analysis calls for greater scrutiny than its domestic counterpart.
For example, in JapanLine, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,3 2 the
Supreme Court struck down a state property tax on foreign cargo
containers because the tax conflicted with the federal power to regulate foreign commerce. The Court not only found that dormant powers applied to foreign commerce, but that they were more extensive
than those in the domestic area. 33 Further, the rationale offered by
the Court supports the notion that foreign commerce is a subset of
foreign affairs.
Foreign commerce is pre-eminently a matter of national concern.
'In international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse
and trade the people of the United States act through34a single government with unified and adequate national power.'
In a similar case, Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax
Bd.,35 the Supreme Court reviewed California's unitary business tax
on a Delaware corporation doing business in California and overseas.
In upholding the tax, Justice Brennan found no discrimination against
37
foreign commerce 36 and no implication of foreign policy issues.
However, he did recognize the inherent problem with state laws
which create the possibility of retaliation by a foreign government
against the nation as a whole. 38 Further, he reiterated the concerns
expressed in Japan Line regarding the "one voice" issue.
Thus, a state tax at variance with federal policy will violate the
'one voice' standard if it either implicates foreign policy issues
which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear
is, of course,
federal directive. The second of these considerations
39
essentially a species of pre-emption analysis.
32.
33.

441 U.S. 434 (1979).
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). "Although the

Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regulate commerce 'with foreign
Nations' and 'among the several States' in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders
intended the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater." Id.
34. Id. (quoting Board of Trustees v. United States, 284 U.S. 48, 59 (1933); see also id., at
n.13.
35. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
36. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.159, 184 (1983).
37. Id. at 197.
38. Id. at 194.
39. Id. at 194 (emphasis in original).
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The differences between ContainerCorp. and Japan Line help to
define the point beyond which states may not venture in the area of
foreign commerce. In terms of foreign policy implications, one significant distinction between Container Corp. and Japan Line appears to
be the subject of the tax. In Japan Line, the tax was levied on a foreign company, thus creating the possibility of retaliation against the
nation as a whole. 40 However, in ContainerCorp., the tax was levied
on a United States corporation and was not directed at any specific
foreign nation. 4 1 Consequently, the Court found the threat of retaliation "attenuated at best."' 42 In addition, the tax in Japan Line posed a
greater threat to uniformity in international tax matters because it
created a "multiple tax" on foreign property.4 3 In contrast, the taxing
scheme in ContainerCorp. created occasional multiple taxation, 4 but
was found to be generally fair 45 and not in an area calling for uniform
federal regulation. 46 These distinctions seem to place ContainerCorp.
47
squarely in the "balancing area" of commerce clause analysis,
whereas the tax in Japan Line ran afoul of the "one voice" standard,
both in terms of foreign commerce and foreign affairs, thus never
48
reaching a balancing test.
However, the Court in both cases refers to the increased scrutiny
afforded foreign commerce clause problems as well as the tendency of
such problems to implicate foreign policy matters. 49 These considerations suggest that a threshold question in foreign commerce cases
ought to be whether foreign policy issues are implicated. If so, a separate foreign affairs analysis should be applied; if not, a more rigorous
version of the domestic commerce clause should be applied.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 450 (1979).
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.159, 195 (1983).
Id. at 195.
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451-52.

44.

Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 193.

45. Id. at 184.
46. Id. at 193-94.
47. Justice Brennan's opinion appeared to apply the Pike balancing test to the tax in
Container Corp. For example, he found that the tax was based on a legitimate local interest
which only had an incidental impact on foreign affairs. Container Corp. of America v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.159, 195-96 (1983). Further, he found the primary alternative to

the state's tax legislation would have had a similar impact on foreign affairs. Id. at 192. For a
discussion of the Pike balancing test, see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
48. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453-54 (1979).
49. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448; Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 185-86.
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Preemption Doctrine

An alternate approach which has been applied to both foreign
commerce and foreign affairs is the preemption doctrine. Preemption
occurs whenever a state law (1) intrudes in an area wholly occupied
by the federal government, (2) conflicts with a specific federal regulation, or (3) frustrates the purpose of a federal policy. 50 The problem
with using preemption is that it presumes the states have concurrent
power to regulate in the given area. Such is not the case with foreign
affairs. Thus, preemption would apply only in situations where a
legitimate state law, operating in an area where the federal and state
government have concurrent power, indirectly affects foreign policy,
51
and then only as an alternate ground for review.
For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz5 2 the Supreme Court held
that registration of aliens may be a concurrent power, albeit a narrowly defined one, because of the state's interest in gathering information about the composition of its resident population. 53 The Court
then turned to a preemption analysis, finding that Congress had
clearly manifested its intent to establish a comprehensive system of
alien registration, a system which precluded enforcement of the con54
flicting state law.
Notably, Justice Black's decision in Hines was devoted largely to
a discussion of federal foreign affairs powers. 5 But, rather than finding that the state had no power to register aliens within its borders,
Justice Black relied on the broad (as opposed to exclusive) constitutional authority of Congress in the area and found the state law
preempted.
One potential problem with this analysis is that by avoiding the
"state power" question, while at the same time emphasizing federal
foreign affairs power under the rubric of preemption, the Hines deci50. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
51. One source of confusion may be that balancing tests applied to legitimate state laws
which indirectly affect foreign commerce or policy may involve weighing the federal interest in
a particular area. Such an analysis would be similar to that employed under the preemption
doctrine.
52. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
53. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941); see also id. at 68 n.22 (comparing the
limited state power to that which exists in the area of interstate commerce, e.g., where states
are allowed to restrict the introduction of diseased livestock even though such a restriction
directly regulates interstate commerce. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902)).
54. Hines, 312 U.S. at 74.
55. Id. at 62-9.
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sion seems to retreat from the concept of dormant foreign affairs powers, or at the very least, to confuse the two doctrines.
However, twenty-seven years later, the Supreme Court did address the state power question in Zschernig v. Miller,56 laying the
foundation for a dormant foreign affairs power similar to that applied
in the commerce clause area.
C. Dormant Foreign Affairs Powers
In Zschernig, the United States Supreme Court examined an Oregon statute which required that certain conditions be met before allowing non-resident aliens to take property by succession or
testamentary disposition. The case involved an East German next of
kin who was denied certain property belonging to an Oregon citizen
57
who died intestate. The property in question escheated to the state.
The main conditions of the statute were: 1) reciprocal laws of
succession in the foreign country, and 2) proof that the foreign heirs
would receive the property without threat of confiscation by the foreign government. 58 The Supreme Court of Oregon found the second
requirement unsatisfied because of the political system in East
Germany. 59
Justice William 0. Douglas, writing for the majority, found that
state officials had gone beyond the "routine reading of foreign laws"
which the Court had, in the past, recognized as legitimate. 6° Instead,
he found that probate courts had "launched inquiries into the type of
governments that obtain in particular foreign nations .. ..,61 Such
inquiries had more than an "incidental" effect on foreign affairs and
had "great potential for disruption or embarrassment. ' 62 Further, after reviewing past Oregon decisions applying the statute, Douglas
concluded "that foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of
the 'cold war,' and the like are the real desiderata. Yet they of course
are matters for the Federal Government, not for local probate
' 63

courts.

Despite the traditional regulation by states of descent and distri56.

389 U.S. 429 (1968).

57.

Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 430 (1968).

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

ORS § 111.070.
Zschernig v. Miller, 243 Or. 567, 412 P.2d 781, 792 (1968).
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433 (citing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947)).
Id. at 434.
Id. at 435.

63.

Id. at 437-38.
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bution, the Court found the law as applied exceeded the boundaries of
state power because it interfered with the United States' exclusive
control over the conduct of foreign relations." However, the majority
did not strike the law down because of any direct conflict with a
treaty provision or other federal law. Rather, the law was stricken
because its operation took it within the exclusive domain of the federal government. In this sense, the invalidation of the Oregon statute
takes on the appearance of preemption, with a valid succession law
being stricken because it intrudes in an area wholly occupied by the
federal government.
However, the distinction is that the succession law did not intrude on any federal "succession policy." Rather, it indirectly affected the ability of the Executive to conduct foreign affairs.
Accordingly, the discussion was about exclusive rather than concurrent powers and the preemption doctrine did not apply. The Court's
power to invalidate the law in this case is based on the same "dormant" powers theory used in commerce clause analysis. 65 Thus, it is
of no consequence that the federal government had not spoken directly on the succession question raised in Zschernig. This was
brought out more clearly in the concurring opinion where Justice
Stewart held the statute invalid on its face. 66 He pointed out that the
issue was one of power, and in resolving it, the Court found that Oregon did not have the power to engage in, or directly affect, foreign
relations, regardless of whether or not the statute was in conflict with
67
State Department policy.
The test applied by the majority in Zschernig seemed to focus
primarily on the impact of the law on foreign relations. Even though
the purpose (regulating succession) was arguably legitimate rather
than pretextual, the potential impact of the law as applied was enough
to render it an invalid intrusion upon the federal foreign affairs powers. 68 However, the test was never clearly delineated. Rather, the
Court made passing reference to "forbidden" inquires into the nature
of particular foreign governments, and suggested that such inquiries
create "great potential for disruption or embarrassment. "69
64. Id. at 440.
65. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
66. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 442 (1968) (Stewart, J. concurring, with Brennan,
J., joining)).
67. Id. at 442-43.
68. Id. at 434-35.
69. Id. at 434-36.
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Nonetheless, Zschernig appears to present serious problems for
state and local divestment legislation. For even if one accepts the purpose of divestment laws as legitimate, as opposed to pretextual, the
potential-and actual-impact of the laws would seem to place them
at odds with the Constitutional division of powers seen in Zschernig.
As with the law in Zschernig, divestment laws involve inquiries into
the inner workings of particular foreign nations-in this case, one foreign nation: South Africa. And in Zschernig, it was the potential impact which was found unduly burdensome-the State Department did
not object to the law, nor were there any diplomatic protests over
Oregon's succession decisions. 70 In contrast, the impact of divestment
legislation has clearly passed the "potential impact" level, 7 1 although
the degree of actual impact is debatable. Thus, the circumstances
under which the court struck down the law in Zschernig would appear to be less compelling than those found in the case of divestment
legislation. This would suggest that divestment legislation would be
unconstitutional under the rule of Zschernig. However, as mentioned
above, the rule in Zschernig needs further clarification.
IV.

PROPOSED MODEL FOR ANALYZING STATE LAWS
AFFECTING THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS

A.

Initial Considerations

One initial consideration is: why create an additional model or
test for analyzing conflicts between states and the federal government
concerning foreign affairs? What is wrong with the current approaches? First, as discussed above, the preemption doctrine is rarely
applicable to these conflicts because states simply do not have concurrent powers in most areas which come within the rubric of foreign
affairs. The Hines case is an exception. However, even in Hines, the
Court discussed at length the federal foreign affairs powers and flirted
with a dormant foreign affairs analysis. 72 Since the Court in
Zschernig subsequently picked up the dormant foreign affairs theme
and gave it legitimacy, 73 there seems little reason to rely on the familiar, but in this instance limited, doctrine of preemption. In addition,
reliance on preemption would allow states to indirectly pursue foreign
70. Id. at 460 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71. See, e.g., Barratt, Can External Leverage Pressure South Africa?, 57 Bus. & Soc'Y
REV. 68, 72 (1986).

72.
73.

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-69 (1941).
389 U.S. at 441.
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policy goals in any area where Congress or the Executive remains silent, or where the state law is generally in accord with federal purposes.74 Such a state of affairs is in obvious conflict with the Court's
repeated emphasis on the need to "speak with one voice" in matters of
75
foreign affairs.
Second, the distinction between foreign commerce and foreign
affairs seems somewhat artificial in modem times. For example, modem tools of diplomacy range from economic boycotts on the one
hand, to favored nation status on the other; from granting access to
United States' markets to restricting United States investment or sales
in foreign countries. All of these commercial decisions are inextricably bound to foreign affairs matters. They are, in essence, a subset of
foreign affairs. 76 Further, using foreign commerce clause tests to deterrnine the validity of state enactments which affect both foreign
commerce and foreign policy may result in needless confusion. While
foreign commerce and foreign policy are interrelated, it is conceivable
that a given state law may have varying effects on each. Consequently, each deserves separate consideration.
Further, assuming the test under the foreign commerce clause
approach would be less strict than the one under the foreign affairs
powers approach, 77 reliance on the foreign commerce clause could encourage states to couch foreign policy related laws in economic terms,
thereby setting up a pretext to avoid added judicial scrutiny. 78 In
other words, without a dormant foreign affairs power, states could
couch foreign policy initiatives in economic terms to avoid prima facie
invalidity, pass the less strict foreign commerce clause test, and un74. See generally, Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 256
(1965).
75. See supra note 9.
76. See generally Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448-451
(1978) (where the Court includes "speaking with one voice" as an added factor when dealing
with foreign commerce clause cases as opposed to domestic commerce clause cases). See also
supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
77. Since states operate in foreign commerce on a regular basis, whereas they are precluded from conducting foreign affairs, it seems likely that the constitutional test of laws dealing with the former would be less strict; possibly somewhere between domestic commerce
clause cases and foreign affairs cases in terms of the court's level of scrutiny. That the level of
scrutiny would be greater than that in domestic commerce clause cases has already been determined in Japan Line and elsewhere. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 279-283 (J.
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
78. See, e.g., Comment, FederalPreemption and the South African Sanctions:A Survival
Guide for States and Cities, 10 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 693, 739 (1988) (suggesting that
a state's ficsal concerns serve to legitimize state divestment legislation).
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dermine the federal governments ability to exercise its foreign affairs
powers-without ever having to justify the law in terms of its indirect
impact on such powers.
In developing a model for analyzing state laws which might infringe upon exclusive federal foreign affairs powers, we will rely primarily on the factors discussed above in Zschernig, Hines, and Japan
Line. Included among these factors are: 1) whether the state law concerns a legitimate or traditional state function;79 2) the impact of the
law on the ability of the executive to function in the area of foreign
affairs, including the ability to "speak with one voice;" 8 0 3) whether
the law conflicts with any federal policy or law; 8' and 4) whether the
law discriminates against particular foreign nations, or requires states
to inquire into the nature of foreign governments, such that there exists the possibility of retaliation against the nation as a whole. 82 The
first factor deals with the source of power 83 and the purpose of the
law, while the remaining three factors involve the "impact" of the
law.
Thus, the first part of the test asks whether or not the state law
was enacted for a legitimate purpose. In this case, the illegitimate
purpose would be to influence the internal affairs of a foreign nation
or to otherwise engage in foreign affairs activities. 84 The second part
of the test, using the latter three factors, would involve balancing putative benefits of the law against the potential burdens placed on foreign affairs. After Zschernig, the balancing test would have to include
"potential," as well as actual impact. 85 Also, in view of Wickard v.
Filburn,86 the effect of the law "in the aggregate" would have to be
considered to some degree.
79. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968).
80. Id. at 440-41; Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448-49.
81. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
82. Id. at 63-64; Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441; Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 453 (1978).
83. Normally, the "power" issue arises only in federal action cases since federal powers
are enumerated. Conversely, when examining the validity of state action, the inquiry normally
begins with limitations on state power because the source of power, the sovereign state, is
seldom at issue. However, as discussed in the opening section of this Comment, foreign affairs
may be one area in which states have no inherent power. See, for example, Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in Zschernig, where he finds that Oregon does not have the power to enact
such legislation and consequently, the legislation is invalid "on its face." Zschernig, 389 U.S.
at 442.
84. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 442-43 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 435.
86. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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Fortunately, in fashioning a test using the above factors, we need
not start from "scratch." Because the dynamics involved in dormant
commerce clause cases are essentially the same as in dormant foreign
affairs cases, such a test could be patterned after the Pike test mentioned earlier.8 7 This would be accomplished by simply adding some
"teeth" to the variables and substituting "foreign relations" for "interstate commerce." To wit, once foreign relations issues have been
implicated, the following test would apply:
1) If the primary purpose of the statute is to affect the internal politics of a foreign nation or to otherwise engage
88
in foreign affairs, the statute is void.
2) If the primary purpose of the statute is to promote legitimate local public interests, it will be upheld unless the
potential burden imposed on foreign relations outweighs
the putative local benefits.
3) In weighing the benefits and burdens, major factors include: 1) the nature of the local interest; 2) the availability of less burdensome alternatives; 3) the degree to
which the statute, in effect, impairs the federal government's ability to "speak with one voice" in its conduct
of foreign affairs; and 4) the degree to which the statute,
in effect, discriminates against a specific nation or group
of nations such that it raises the possibility of retaliation
against the United States.
The first prong of the test addresses the constitutional structure
of our nation, recognizing that States have no power in the area of
foreign affairs, that foreign affairs are within the exclusive domain of
the federal government, and that any laws promulgated to effectuate
foreign policy goals of state officials are necessarily void. 9 The "primary purpose" language addresses the problem of pretext. Thus, a
statute could not be saved by the mere presence of a legitimate purpose or by post hoc rationalizations; the legitimate purpose must be
primary.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
88. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J., concurring).
89. This not only makes sense in terms of the need to act as one nation with respect to
other nations, but also in terms of our democratic processes. When people vote for state officials they are apt to consider local issues such as property taxes, mass transit, and crime.
When voting for federal officials, people are apt to consider national and international issues
such as social security, welfare, defense, and foreign policy. In other words, the electorate did
not elect state officials because of their foreign policy experience or lack thereof, and in that
sense, they are not authorized to speak on such issues.
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The second prong of the test is fashioned after the Pike test, with
some changes made to increase the level of scrutiny.90 The "potential
burden" language reflects the holding in Zschernig which was based,
in part, on the Oregon statute's "great potential for disruption and
embarrassment." 91 "Clearly excessive in relation to" is replaced by
"outweighs," thus reducing the plaintiff's burden of proof.
The Pike test language regarding "incidental effects" was
dropped because it suggests categories of effects, some being less than
incidental and some being more than incidental. Rather than attempt
to compartmentalize the varying degrees by which foreign relations
are affected, a sliding scale approach would seem more appropriate.
For example, a potential incidental effect might only require a legitimate state interest and a lack of comparable alternatives; a potential
significant effect might require a substantial state interest and a lack
of viable alternatives; and an actual significant effect might require a
compelling state interest and no less burdensome alternatives.
The third "prong" is simply a list of relevant factors which appeared in the main cases discussed above: Japan Line, Hines, and
Zschernig.
Perhaps the best way to examine the dynamics of the proposed
model is to apply it to an existing state statute. California's divestment legislation, Assembly Bill 134 (hereinafter AB 134), will be used
for purposes of illustration. 92
V.

DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS MODEL APPLIED

California's divestment legislation, signed into law on September
26, 1986, requires that:
On or after January 1, 1987, state trust moneys shall not be
used to make additional or new investments or to renew existing
90. Given the structural mandate of the Constitution regarding the exclusivity of foreign
affairs power, and the practical problems inherent in allowing fifty states to participate in
setting foreign policy, a reasonably strict test would seem appropriate. Additionally, the
Supreme Court has already recognized that, because of the foreign affairs implications, the
foreign commerce power is greater than the domestic commerce power. Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1978). It would seem to follow that the proposed
dormant foreign affairs powers would likewise be greater.
91. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 435 (1968)
92. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 16640-16650 (West Supp. 1987). For a general discription of
AB 134, see Review of Selected 1986 CaliforniaLegislation, 18 PAC. L.J. 543 (1987). See also
Challanges to the Constitutionality of the California Divestment Statute, 19 PAC. L.J. 217

(1987) (questioning the constitutionality of the law based on preepmtion, foreign commerce
clause, and California's State Constitution).
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investments in business firms that have business operations in
South Africa, or business arrangements with the government of
South Africa ... [nor] to make additional or new investments in
financial institutions that make loans to any South African corpo93
ration, or with the government of South Africa.

On its face, the law implicates foreign affairs issues, thus triggering an application of the dormant foreign affairs test. The threshold
question of purpose is discussed in section 1 of AB 134, which is devoted largely to a discussion of the repugnant practices of apartheid in
South Africa. 94 The section concludes that state money should be
divested for two reasons: first, such investments are "fiscally imprudent, given the political and economic instability of South Africa;"
and second, they are "inconsistent with the moral and political values
95
of the people of California.
Despite the reference to fiscal policy, the plain language of the
act suggests that its primary purpose is to protest against apartheid
and influence businesses to pull out of South Africa. Another factor
in support of this interpretation is that most United States companies
targeted by divestment laws 96 have less than one percent of their operations in South Africa9 7 and would not suffer significant losses, even

in the worst case scenario. 98
Consequently, AB 134 fails the first prong; it is an indirect economic boycott of South Africa, and its primary purpose is to force the
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16641, 16642 (West Supp. 1987).
94. CAL. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST AB 134, ch. 1254, section 1 (1986).
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that:
(a) The Country of South Africa is the only political system on this planet which
constitutionally enshrines a political system whereby a small minority of the population has the power and authority to separate, discriminate against, and deny fundamental political, social, and economic rights to, 83 percent of its population solely on
the basis of race ....
(e) Californians of all races, creeds, and religions regard the policies and practices of apartheid in South Africa, as they do repressive policies and practices in
other countries, as repugnant to the priciples of individual liberty, social justice, and
political and social enfranchisement, which are fundamental to free societies everywhere. The opposition of Californians to apartheid reflects the deep and long-standing opposition of the American people to inequality and injustice wherever it may be
found.
Id. at 101.
95. CAL. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST AB 134, ch. 1254, section 1 (1986).
96. For a description of the activities of major companies and the extent of their operations in South Africa, see Moskowitz, Company Performance Roundup, 57 Bus. & SOc'Y REV.
125 (1986).
97. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1985 at D4, col. 3.
98. See Note, supra note 3, at 822-24.

1989]

DormantForeign Affairs Doctrine

current government of South Africa to change its internal policies of
apartheid. The inclusion of a legitimate, but secondary, purpose does
not serve to validate the statute.
Even assuming that AB 134 passed the first prong and that economic concerns were the primary factor in passing the statute, the
Act arguably would not fair well in the balancing test. If the nature
of the state interest is sound investing, it is doubtful that withdrawing
investments from General Motors, Ford, IBM, and other major companies operating in South Africa is the only viable way, or even a
reasonable way, to promote that interest. 99
In terms of "speaking with one voice," AB 134 and similar legislation in other states established policies at state and local levels
which were at odds with President Reagan's program of "constructive
engagement," which called for a series of economic sanctions but also
allowed for continued presence by United States companies on the
theory that they are a positive force for change. 100 More recently,
Congress overrode the President's veto to pass the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986,101 which established broader sanctions.
However, in passing the Act, Congress chose not to include a provision in the House version which would have required all U.S. companies to withdraw from South Africa within six months. 10 2 Thus, to
the extent that AB 134 indirectly encourages businesses to leave
South Africa, it may not be consistent with federal policy. Rather, it
may be undermining U.S. foreign policy by adding to the cacophony
of "voices" emanating from this country.
The final factor, the prospect of retaliation against the nation as a
whole, would also appear to militate against upholding AB 134. This
is because the discriminatory effect of AB 134 and similar legislation
is focused on one country, rather than on economically unstable countries generally.
In conclusion, AB 134 would probably fail both prongs of the
proposed dormant foreign affairs test. First, it is a direct intrusion
99. There is some concern that selling stock in such companies as part of the divestment
plan would expose state agencies to liability for breach of fiduciary obligation. In other words,
such sales would hurt state portfolios rather than help them, and by divesting for political
reasons, states would be reducing the value of pensions for state employees. A number of
states have included immunity provisions to preclude such a possibility. See CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§ 16649, 16650 (West Supp. 1987).
100. See Exec. Order No. 12532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36861 (1985).
101. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986).
102. See Felton, 'Less Than Brilliant' Administration Role Contributed to Momentum for
Sanctions, 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2340, 2341 (1986).
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upon the federal government's foreign affairs powers. Second, even in
terms of indirect effects, the burden it places on the nations ability to
conduct foreign policy arguably outweighs the putative local benefits.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The development of a dormant foreign affairs doctrine is needed
to ensure that our government can speak clearly and authoritatively
in the international setting. Allowing states to engage in foreign policy, directly or indirectly, creates the potential for confusion and impairs the performance of federal officials whose duty it is to conduct
such policies. The Constitution provides citizens of the various states
with a mechanism for influencing foreign policy through the election
of members of Congress and the Executive branch. It is these elected
officials, and not those at the state and local levels, who have been
empowered by the people to speak for this nation.
Glenn S. McRoberts

